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2 Abstract
Obfuscation is the action of making something unintelligible. In software development,
this action can be applied to source code or binary applications. The aim of this
dissertation was to implement a tool for the obfuscation of C and C++ source code.
The motivation was to allow proprietary code to be distributed to third-parties without
risking a recreation of the intellectual property within it. While many obfuscators
exist, they seldom focus on software that is distributed in source code form. This
dissertation presents the challenges and successes that arose during the development
of a C and C++ source code obfuscator using the Nim programming language [1].
3 Introduction and Problem Specification
There are three major types of attacks that software protection mechanisms aim to
defend against, these attacks can be classified as software piracy, reverse engineering,
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and tampering. Collberg [2] defines these attack types and suggests tools to defend
against each of them. For the purposes of this dissertation, the focus will be on
reverse engineering protection.
The main defense against reverse engineering is obfuscation [2]. Obfuscation can be
said to protect the intellectual property (IP) of software from reverse-engineering
attacks. It is important to protect the IP as it can include sensitive data, algorithms,
or the design of the software which the developer may not wish to be copied [3, Sec.
2]. Obfuscation is defined as the transformation of code into something unintelligible
which preserves the semantics of the original code.
Software can be distributed in two forms, as source code or compiled machine code.
Machine code instructions can be executed directly by a computer’s central processing
unit (CPU). For a programmer, reading these instructions is not an easy task and
writing them is even more difficult. Because of this machine code is usually generated
from source code by a special program called a compiler. An executable or binary file
stores machine code instructions in a format that is specific to a particular operating
system.
Special applications called decompilers can be used to reverse the process of compila-
tion. That is, they take an executable file as input and output high-level source code
which matches the functionality of the executable. A disassembler is a special kind of
decompiler which translates machine language into assembly language. Decompilers
targeting languages such as C++ will often use a disassembler as the first stage of
the decompilation process.
Decompilers are an important and often used tool for the reverse engineering of
machine code. This is why applications designed for obfuscating executables focus
on the obstruction of disassembly and decompilation [4, Sec. 1]. The aptly named
obfuscator application developed in this dissertation does not put any effort into
obstructing decompilation. Instead it focuses on making the source code as difficult
to reverse engineer as possible, by decreasing its overall comprehensibility.
Reverse engineering source code is all about understanding it, figuring out the control
flow and how it interacts with its input data. With enough time, every piece of code
can be reverse engineered, so it is impossible to guarantee complete safety [5, Sec. 1].
But making the reverse engineering economically impractical is often enough.
A tool that obfuscates source code is incredibly valuable for preventing these attacks.
It can be a cheap way to protect IP from third parties who may have disassembled
an executable, or those who need to have access to the source code in order to build
it on a niche platform [6].
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3.1 Challenges
The actual act of obfuscating source code is no easy task. There are many distinct
challenges that need to be explored.
3.1.1 Parsing
Parsing is a necessary pre-requisite for obfuscation, since an obfuscator needs to
understand the code it is obfuscating. Programming languages are often difficult to
parse correctly, this is especially the case for C++ which is often considered to be
the most difficult language to parse. The reason is that C++ has a grammar which
is both huge and ambiguous, with many new revisions such as C++20 still being
designed and implemented.
void f(double adouble) {
int i(int(adouble));
}
Listing 1: Most vexing parse: an example of ambiguity in C++.
Because of the complexity involved in parsing C and C++ code, developing a full-
featured parser would take a lot of time. It is possible to take some shortcuts, perhaps
a minimal parser that picks out desired syntactic elements of a source code file could
be written quickly, but it would always be missing vital features for some users. In
such a parser the foundations would always be rough and without taking into account
the full grammar of the C++ language from the start it would be doomed to a dead
end at some point.
Thankfully the most popular C and C++ compilers, gcc and clang, are open source.
Even though their codebase is large, the code responsible for parsing is logically
separated from any other functionality, making it reusable from other applications.
The compiler’s parsers are incredibly robust and support every current C/C++
feature.
Reusing a parser comes with its own challenges, but solving them is much easier
than writing a custom parser from scratch. Section 6 discusses the implementation
challenges in detail.
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3.1.2 Transformations
Once the code can be parsed, it needs to be represented in the program’s memory.
The representation needs to be flexible enough to be mutable, in order to facilitate
various code transformations. The transformations are necessary to obfuscate the
code.
The objective is to apply transformations that deliberately obfuscate the source code
of a program, so that its purpose or logic is concealed without any alterations being
made to its functionality.
Transformations can be separated into three main classes [7, Sec. 2]:
1. Data transformation: The data inside a program is usually presented in a way
that makes it easily readable to programmers. At the most fundamental level
this applies to literals such as integers and strings. An integer can be represented
using multiple different radices including hexadecimal, octal or decimal. An
integer can also be transformed into a constant expression (a form of data
encoding obfuscation [8, Sec. 3.3.2]), and other static data may be converted to
procedural data as well [7, Sec. 2]. In most languages strings can be escaped
using various radices as well, including hexadecimal escape sequences [6]. More
advanced forms of data transformations include variable splitting and changing
the scope of variables [6].
2. Lexical transformation1 [2]: The code’s lexical information refers to the names
of identifiers, the comments, and the whitespace used to indent the code to
make it more readable. When performing this transformation, comments and
whitespace are usually completely removed [8, Sec. 3.3.1], but bogus whitespace
or comments designed to obfuscate the code can be introduced instead. A
more complicated transformation involves changing the identifiers in the code,
including the names of variables, classes, and functions. Identifiers can be
renamed in multiple ways as long as the names are unique, they can be changed
randomly, based on an algorithm such as a hash function, or by look up in a
look-up table. This transformation does not modify any of the semantics in the
code.
3. Control transformation: The semantics of the program are modified through
this transformation. As a result, it may affect the runtime of the program in
a negative way [7]. Some techniques that can be used for this transformation
include addition of dead code or the modification of control structure predicates
1Otherwise known as layout transformation [7], [9]
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such as if statements or for loops to make them more difficult to understand [5,
Sec. 1].
Researchers [5], [7], [10], [11] are always investigating new and more complex ways to
obfuscate code by coming up with novel transformation techniques. Implementing all
such techniques is outside the scope of this dissertation, but the obfuscator project
does offer a great modern test bed for them.
3.1.3 Rendering
The data structure that contains the obfuscated code doesn’t reflect the code itself,
so it cannot be easily written to a file. This data structure needs to be converted
into a valid C or C++ source code representation.
The generated C or C++ source code needs to be free of errors. It cannot omit any
syntactical constructs as that would prevent the code from being compiled for testing.
3.1.4 Correctness
An obfuscator is said to be correct if the obfuscated code it outputs is always
functionally equivalent to the original code. Unfortunately an obfuscator has a very
real chance of changing the semantics of code in a way that breaks the resulting
application. This should never happen, but as with all software, bugs are possible
and will need to be fixed.
The correctness of an obfuscator is important, but proving this correctness isn’t
easy. Changes in semantics may be subtle, they may only show up on certain niche
platforms or under very specific runtime circumstances. For a language like C or
C++ verifying the correctness thoroughly is practically impossible, but a good testing
methodology can find many issues.
C and C++ are both compiled languages, they use a compiler that performs static
analysis of the code to verify certain aspects of its correctness. This is the first
correctness test, if the obfuscator generates invalid code the compilation will often fail
with an error. It’s important to verify that the obfuscated code compiles. Sometimes
the compiler may give useful warnings as well, it is also a good idea to check that no
new warnings have been introduced in the obfuscated code.
The second correctness test is a runtime test. The resulting executable of the
obfuscated program should be tested. This is challenging as testing certain pieces
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of software thoroughly may not be possible. Even if rigorous testing cannot be
done, a best effort should be made to ensure the software works as intended after
its source code has been obfuscated. Test suites provided by the software should be
used whenever possible to make the testing easier and more reliable.
3.1.5 Quality of obscurity
Collberg [2] explains that an obfuscator should maximize the obscurity of the obfus-
cated code. The obscurity of code refers to how time-consuming understanding and
reverse engineering it is.
Unfortunately measuring obscurity empirically is difficult, it would require a controlled
experiment involving professional developers and a measurement of the time it takes
them to understand an obfuscated vs. an original piece of code. As an example
Regano et al. [12] has performed such an experiment and found that their VarMerge
obfuscator “reduces by six times the number of successful attacks per unit of time.”
Performing a similar experiment would require significant amount of resources and
time which are not available for this dissertation. As an alternative, there are ways
to measure obscurity indirectly.
The alternative way to measure obscurity is by calculating the complexity of code.
There are multiple metrics which calculate this:
• McCabe’s cyclomatic complexity which measures the number of independent
control paths in a program.
• Halstead complexity measures which combine a number of properties including
the number of distinct operators and operands.
Naeem et. al. [11] investigates these metrics in the context of decompilers and
obfuscators. Some alternatives to McCabe’s and Halstead’s metrics are offered,
including a measure of the program size, the conditional complexity and the identifier
complexity.
The advantages of McCabe and Halstead metrics are that they are widely supported
and tools exist for measuring them. László et. al. [5] uses McCabe’s complexity
together with program size for evaluating the obscurity of their obfuscator. Unfortu-
nately these metrics are not a good way to evaluate the obscurity of the obfuscator
developed in this dissertation. They measure a very specific complexity feature which
is not affected by the obfuscator application.
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A related concept is that of resilience, i.e. an obfuscator is resilient if it confuses an
automatic de-obfuscator. A developer wishing to reverse engineer obfuscated source
code will often turn to a tool that “prettifies” or “auto-formats” the code. These
tools might be able to make reverse engineering significantly easier.
For this dissertation, a proposed approach to testing the quality of the obfuscator is
to feed its output to a “prettifier” tool such as clang-format2. A diff tool can then be
used to measure the difference between the obfuscated code after it’s been prettified
and the original code.
This approach is novel and untested but has a good chance of evaluating both the
resilience and the obscurity in the context of the obfuscator application and how it
compares to other source-to-source obfuscators.
3.2 Related work
Obfuscating C and C++ code is a popular task that started out as a hobby in the
80’s, thanks to the International Obfuscated C Code Contest (IOCCC)3 [7, Sec. 2.C].
In the case of the IOCCC, obfuscation is a creative exercise performed mainly by
human programmers for the purposes of entertainment. In later years, software was
developed to systematically obfuscate code as a defense against reverse engineering.
Today many commercial and open source C/C++ obfuscators exist, including Stun-
nix4, COBF5, CShroud6 and Tigress7.
At the time of writing a Stunnix single developer license is priced at $449, the feature
set of the software goes far beyond obfuscation so the price tag isn’t without merit.
As far as transformations go, the Stunnix obfuscator performs standard layout and
data obfuscations.
CShroud is an open source program licensed under the GPL, it performs layout
transformations including removal of comments and indentation, in addition it con-
verts control structures such as for, while, do/while, if/else and switch into if/goto
structures [8, Sec. 1.4]. Unfortunately CShroud doesn’t appear to be maintained
anymore.
2https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ClangFormat.html
3http://ioccc.org/
4http://stunnix.com/prod/cxxo/
5https://www.plexaure.de/cms/index.php?id=cobf
6https://sourceforge.net/projects/cshroud/
7http://tigress.cs.arizona.edu/
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Tigress is another obfuscator, unlike CShroud its latest release is recent and appears
to be maintained at the time of writing. The Tigress website describes it as “a
diversifying virtualizer/obfuscator for the C language that supports many novel
defenses against both static and dynamic reverse engineering and de-virtualization
attacks.”
Obfuscators that work on binary files also exist, one example of such an application
is called obfuscator-llvm8 which can output an obfuscated binary code file [9, Sec.
2.1.2]. This is different to the obfuscators mentioned above which will output an
obfuscated source code file.
Obfuscation is also a healthy subject of study. Research papers often investigate the
ideal transformations that can be applied to achieve the best defense against reverse
engineering.
4 System Requirements Specification
This section is going to specify the requirements, assumptions and constraints of the
obfuscator application developed as part of this dissertation.
4.1 User interaction
The end user will interact with the obfuscator application using a command-line
interface. This is in line with how most software developers interact with C and C++
compilers.
The application will support a number of flags to modify its behaviour. The usage
will be as follows:
• ./obfuscator <filename>.c or ./obfuscator <filename>.cpp
– Parses the source code located at the specified filename, obfuscates it and
saves the obfuscated source code in <filename>.obf.c or <filename>.obf.cpp.
• Command-line flags:
– -o:<outputFile>
8https://github.com/obfuscator-llvm/obfuscator/wiki
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∗ Save the obfuscated source file in the file path specified.
– --rename
∗ Rename identifiers in the source code (disabled by default).
– -I:<includePath>
∗ Specify an include header path for the C/C++ source code parser.
4.2 Assumptions
The obfuscator application will be given syntactically and semantically valid C or
C++ code. Validity will be defined in terms of the standards supported, which will
include C99 [13] and C++98 [14]. Some features of the C11 and C++11 standards
may also be supported, but code containing those features may be viewed as invalid
by the obfuscator application.
A relatively modern computer system with an access to a terminal will be required
to run the application. Due to the CLI nature of the application the end user will
need to be comfortable with a terminal to use the obfuscator.
4.3 Constraints
The initial version of the obfuscator application will require macOS to run. This is
mainly a constraint due to the operating system that development took place on,
there is no reason the application cannot be compiled on other operating systems
and platforms with little to no changes to the code.
4.4 Requirements
At a high level, the obfuscator application is expected to parse a single C or C++
source code file, obfuscate it and save the obfuscated code into a new file. The
requirements including the specific obfuscation transformations that should be applied
to the code are outlined below.
4.4.1 Formatting and comments
Most developers take great care to format their code in a logical and readable manner.
They also add useful comments to code which describes its semantics. Removing
10
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formatting and comments is a great way to obfuscate code.
The obfuscator should perform a lexical transformation to remove all comments and
formatting including whitespace and newline characters from the code. Listing 2 and
Listing 3 shows the transformation in action.
int main () {
helloWorld(42); // Say hello.
}
Listing 2: Original code
int main(){helloWorld(42);}
Listing 3: Transformed code
The transformation needs to be aware of C syntax. Removing all whitespace indis-
criminately from C or C++ source code would lead to errors. This is evident in
Listing 3 where whitespace is required to separate the function’s return type from
the main identifier.
It is also important to place semi-colons in the correct positions. The end of each
statement needs to be delimited by a semi-colon, other syntactic elements have special
rules for the placement of this delimiter, including predicates in for loops. These
need to be handled appropriately.
4.4.2 Integer and string literals
Literals are present in almost all source code. Integer and string literals can be
obfuscated in a relatively simple manner through data transformation.
Understanding integer literals is easiest when they are represented in the commonly
used decimal numeral system. In C and C++ an integer literal can also be represented
in hexadecimal or octal. For the purposes of obfuscation all integer literals should
be represented using hexadecimal. This transformation is shown in Listing 4 and
Listing 5.
int main () {
int age = 23;
}
Listing 4: Original code
int main () {
int age = 0x17;
}
Listing 5: Transformed code
11
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The obfuscation of integer literals should go a step further. Each integer literal should
be transformed into a constant expression that reproduces the original literal. A single
literal should be separated into at least 4 different random integers, these should be
added and subtracted together to give the original literal. This transformation is
shown in Listing 6 and Listing 7.
int main () {
int age = 23;
}
Listing 6: Original code
int main () {
int age = 759 + 78 - 826 + 12;
}
Listing 7: Transformed code
String literals in source code are usually displayed in a human readable format. Every
string should be obfuscated by randomizing its representation, each character should
be represented either using a hexadecimal escape sequence, a decimal escape sequence
or as-is. The mixing of different escape sequence formats should confuse the reader
and ensure that a simple tool cannot be written to deobfuscate it. This transformation
is shown in Listing 8 and Listing 9.
"Hello"
Listing 8: Original code
"\x48""e\154l\x6F"
Listing 9: Transformed code
To ensure syntax compatibility with C and C++, the transformation must start a new
string literal after each hexadecimal escape sequence. Otherwise code like "\x48e"
would be incorrectly interpreted as a single 48E hexadecimal value instead of two \x48
and e characters.
4.4.3 Boolean expressions
The control paths in source code are essential to its execution, as a result they are an
important way to learn about the code. Many constructs used to control the flow of
execution contain boolean expressions in their predicates, including if, for and while
statements. As a result transforming boolean expressions is an important method of
obfuscating code.
The boolean expressions should be transformed in such a way as to yield the same
results. Doing so is a form of control transformation. A simple transformation that
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should be applied is creating a copy of the original boolean expression, negating it
and placing it inside a newly created && (boolean AND) expression.
int x = 42;
if (x > 12) {}
Listing 10: Original code
int x = 42;
if ((x > 12) && !!(x > 12)) {}
Listing 11: Transformed code
This adds extra noise which, when applied to every boolean expression, significantly
maximizes the obscurity of the obfuscated code.
4.4.4 Identifiers
It is often said in jest that there are only two hard things in Computer Science:
cache invalidation and naming things [15]. This has a ring of truth to it. Software
developers often take great care to name variables, functions and other identifiers in
a way that makes the code easy to understand. Obfuscating these names will have a
great effect on the comprehensibility of the source code.
Ideally all identifier types should be obfuscated, but variable and function names are
a good start. The relevant transformation should be aware of the visibility of the
identifier. If an identifier is exported via a header file, it should not be transformed
as doing so may lead to errors due to cross-source dependencies. Identifiers that are
not exported must be transformed. The transformation is described in Listing 12 and
Listing 13.
int foo(int param) {
int x = 42 + param;
return x;
}
int main() {
int y = 2;
return foo(y);
}
Listing 12: Original code
int i_acbd(int i_eca0) {
int i_9dd4 = 42 + i_eca0;
return i_9dd4;
}
int main() { ❶
int i_4152 = 2;
return i_acbd(i_4152);
}
Listing 13: Transformed code
13
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Note how in Listing 13 the main function defined at ❶ isn’t obfuscated. This is
because the C linker will look for this function name during compilation to use as
the entry point of the program. Renaming it would cause an error.
The rest of the identifiers have all been obfuscated. How these identifiers are obfuscated
is up to the obfuscator implementation. In the case of Listing 13 the first 4 characters
of an MD5 hash function’s output have been used.
4.4.5 Testing
An obfuscator lends itself well to testing, because while it’s a complicated piece of
software it can be easily executed using simple scripts. A tester program or script
should be written to execute the obfuscator on sample source code and verify that
the original and obfuscated source code compiles successfully.
The first testing category will be unit tests where sample source code containing a
single category of specific C and C++ language features will be tested. For example,
two unit tests can be created for array declaration syntax and if statements. A good
range of unit tests should be created to ensure the obfuscator works as expected, and
to make it easier to find issues during development.
The tester should also perform integration tests. The difference between these and
unit tests is that they will test the ability to obfuscate a full project. For every project,
every source code file should be obfuscated, compiled and tested. Real open source
projects should be used for this purpose to ensure the obfuscator works effectively.
5 Design
The architecture of the obfuscator application will be modelled after a typical compiler.
A compiler begins its work in the same manner as the obfuscator: by parsing source
code. The output of these tools is the differentiator, an obfuscator will output
obfuscated source code while a compiler will output machine code or an executable
instead.
A high-level view of obfuscator’s architecture is shown in Figure 1.
14
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5.3 Renderer
The renderer component is the final component in the obfuscator architecture. It is
responsible for converting an AST into its C or C++ source code representation.
The sheer number of different kinds of AST nodes used to represent C and C++
source code means that rendering them all is a difficult process. Having to implement
a fully featured renderer would mean that the obfuscator could not be tested quickly.
A good way to work around this issue is to store the original code in each AST node.
That way, if the renderer cannot handle a specific AST node kind, the original code
can be used instead. This has the advantage that the renderer can be developed
incrementally, but means that while the renderer is unfinished certain code will remain
unobfuscated.
To demonstrate what this means, let’s look at a larger AST example:
Call (origCode: "printf(\"Hello World!\");")
Identifier (origCode: "printf", name: "printf")
StringLiteral (origCode: "\"Hello World!\"", value: "Hello World!")
IfStmt (origCode: "if (true) {\n printf(\"true\"); \n}")
Branch
Identifier (origCode: "true", name: "true")
StmtList (origCode: "printf(\"true\");")
Call (origCode: "printf(\"true\");")
Identifier (origCode: "printf", name: "printf")
StringLiteral (origCode: "\"true\"", value: "true")
Listing 14: A textual representation of a larger AST
Listing 14 shows the AST tree of Listing 15. The children are indented to show the
parent node they belong to. Note the data fields contained in each node.
Assuming that a renderer is used which does not support if statements, Listing 16
shows what the obfuscated code will look like.
printf(100);
if (true) {
printf(200);
}
Listing 15: Source code for the AST in
Listing 14
printf(0x64);if (true) {
printf(200); ❷
}
Listing 16: Code rendered without if
statement support
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6.1 Programming language
The obfuscator application is implemented primarily in Nim9. Nim is a compiled
systems programming language that compiles to C, C++ or Objective C. Nim
produces executables that are dependency free, efficient and cross-platform, the
language has some of the best metaprogramming features out there with support for
things like procedural AST macros.
The choice of implementation language was made from the get go, the main reason
for this choice was the author’s familiarity with the language. As it turned out, the
dependence on a C++ library meant that the only real choices were either C++ or
Nim. Thanks to Nim’s C++ compilation, interfacing with a C++ library is trivial, a
feature that makes Nim just about the only practical alternative to C++.
Writing software in Nim is straightforward, C++ on the other hand is a colossal
language with multiple edge cases and a memory model that makes writing software
safely challenging. C++ also misses some modern language features, for example
modules which are supported by Nim.
6.2 Parser
The libclang library is used to parse C and C++ source code. In order to make use
of it, a thin Nim wrapper had to be written, this was made trivial thanks to the c2nim
tool which generated most of it automatically.
The way in which the libclang library exposes information about the parsed source
code is a bit unusual. It seems to have been designed for the purposes of Integrated
Development Environment (IDE) introspection tools, which only need to understand
a small subset of the source code and not modify it. The information is exposed via a
CXCursor object which represents a single position in the source code, this object can
be queried for information about the syntactical construct that is at the underlying
cursor position.
This is a problematic API for two reasons:
• It’s not immediately obvious what information about a particular CXCursor is
available. The cursor’s kind is exposed, but there is no exhaustive listing of
queries that can be performed against each cursor kind. For example, there is
9https://nim-lang.org
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no easy way to find out how to determine if a function call is an operator or
not.
• The CXCursor object cannot be modified. Even if it could be, the data about
the syntactical construct is not exposed directly.
Research into these issues revealed more specific limitations of libclang, for example
the inability to retrieve the value of an integer literal [16]. This was a showstopper
for a while and it seemed like libclang would have to be abandoned in favour of
something else.
Further investigation revealed that libclang is a C wrapper on top of the original
clang parser written in C++. Using the clang parser directly, although much more
difficult, was always a possibility. But looking at the libclang source code closely
revealed certain abstract pointers to data exposed through the CXCursor object. A
further look at how the different libclang query functions work revealed that these
pointers are actually pointing to the original clang parser objects. By wrapping
the underlying C++ classes in Nim, it is possible to access these objects and the
information they store [17]. This approach allows the continued use of libclang and
access to all the necessary information by falling back to C++ when necessary.
6.2.1 Mutability
As discussed in subsection 5.1, the parser component of the architecture needs to
produce a mutable AST. The CXCursor object exposed by libclang doesn’t support
modifications, only queries. This is also true of the underlying clang parser objects.
A decision was made to define a custom AST object which would be built by iterating
through all the CXCursor objects. The build function responsible for this is defined in
the ast module and is used during the parsing step as shown in Figure 4.
The resulting AstNode object is a tree containing a representation of the parsed source
code. Each AstNode object contains data specific to each AST kind. This data is
stored inside the object’s attributes so it’s easy to know what information is stored
about a particular AST kind.
The API exposed by the ast module is much more straightforward than that of
libclang or even the clang parser itself. Because of that it might be worth exposing it
as a library for other applications to take advantage of. Of course there is still plenty
of room for improvement as it doesn’t expose all of the information that the clang
parser exposes.
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6.2.2 Preprocessor
The C/C++ preprocessor is a completely separate tool to the parser. It is responsible
for some important tasks, such as the inclusion of header files, macro expansions,
and conditional compilation. Because this preprocessor is executed first, the parser
exposes very little information about what the code looked like before preprocessing
took place.
This creates multiple problems for the obfuscator, in general these problems mean that
the obfuscator cannot restore some preprocessor directives. Some of these problems
have been solved, but others persist. Table 1 shows a summary of preprocessor
constructs and whether they are handled correctly by the obfuscator application.
Table 1: Summary of the preprocessor features obfuscator supports.
Construct Handled correctly Example
Header inclusion Yes #include <stdio.h>
Macro expansion Yes Listing 17
Conditional compilation No Listing 18
#define PI 3.14159
printf("%f", PI);
Listing 17: Macro expansion
#ifdef __unix__
# include <unistd.h>
#elif defined _WIN32
# include <windows.h>
#endif
Listing 18: Conditional compilation
The libclang parser provides information about inclusion directives and macro ex-
pansions. This allows the obfuscator to render these constructs in the obfuscated
code.
Unfortunately no information is provided about conditional compilation directives.
When parsed, the AST of Listing 18 contains only a single inclusion directive, with
the included file depending on the operating system that the parser is executed on.
This is a limitation which causes the produced AST to always be dependent on the
platform that it is produced on. For some use cases it is a serious limitation, but for
others it may in fact be a feature. Solving this limitation is beyond the scope of this
dissertation, but there are multiple approaches that can be considered in the future
for solving it:
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• Write a custom pre-processor which adds conditional compilation directives to
the AST produced by libclang and the ast module.
• Investigate the clang source code to see if there is any possibility to enable some
sort of parsing mode which will add the conditional compilation directives to
the AST.
6.3 Transformer
The transformer component is implemented fully in Nim in just over 100 lines of code.
This makes it the simplest component in the obfuscator.
This component’s job is to transform the AST in such a way as to obfuscate it. The
transformations performed include:
• Replacing integers literals with simple mathematical expressions. This is the
transformation shown in Figure 4.
• Giving anonymous structs obfuscated names. This is used as an aid during
rendering.
• Replacing the == and != equality operators by ^ (XOR).
• Adding noise to boolean expressions, by adding a copy of the same expression
with two boolean NOT prefixes, as described in subsubsection 4.4.3.
• Renaming function, variable, and function argument identifiers.
Most of these transformations are relatively trivial. The identifier renaming, which is
most complicated, is described in more detail in the following section.
6.3.1 Renaming identifiers
The transformation itself is very simple, but deciding whether it should be performed
for a specific identifier is non-trivial.
There are 3 different pieces of information collected by the ast module for the purposes
of this transformation:
• Unified Symbol Resolution (USR): this is a string that uniquely identifies
functions, classes, variables, etc. across different files. It allows the obfuscator
to change the names of variables consistently across different C/C++ source
code files.
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• isGlobal flag: this determines whether an identifier is defined inside any of the
included header files.
• referencedLocally flag: this determines whether a referenced identifier is defined
inside the file being obfuscated.
Global identifiers, as determined by the isGlobal flag, are not renamed because they
may be used by external software. Similarly, only identifiers referenced locally are
renamed.
The new name for identifiers is generated using the USR string. This string is hashed
using MD5 and used as the new name. This produces consistent and reliable identifier
obfuscations.
6.4 Renderer
Sometimes parser libraries implement their own rendering functionality. This is
the case with clang, but this functionality cannot be reused because the obfuscator
implements a custom AST.
A custom renderer is difficult to write, but it does give far more control about the
code that is created. For an obfuscator this is really important.
The obfuscator application’s renderer is written completely in Nim. As of writing,
it supports a vast majority of syntactical constructs, with unsupported constructs
being rendered using the original code as described in subsection 5.3.
The renderer intentionally omits whitespace as much as possible, this gets rid of all
formatting and has the effect that there is no newline characters in the obfuscated
code. The renderer is also responsible for rendering literals, it does so consistent with
the system specification described in section 4.
6.5 Testing
The test suite is implemented in the tester.nim file. Running nimble test in the
obfuscator’s directory will compile the tester module and then execute it. Upon
execution tester runs a suite of unit and integration tests. Figure 5 shows the
successful execution of nimble test.
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These tests ensure that the code semantics remain the same after obfuscation and
that the obfuscated code is valid C or C++ code.
Integration tests feature a similar set of actions, but for larger source code files
including a large open source C project called wrk10. The wrk program is a high
performance HTTP benchmark tool. The test suite verifies that it can be obfuscated
and that the obfuscated code can be compiled.
6.6 Demonstration
For demonstration purposes a simple web application was put together ahead of the
demo day. This web app wasn’t a part of the original system requirements, it was
created simply to show off the obfuscator in a more user friendly manner. Figure 6
shows what the interface of this web application looks like. It can be accessed at the
following URL: https://picheta.me/obfuscator.
10https://github.com/wg/wrk
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for performing this evaluation will consist of the following steps for each source code
file:
• The original source code will be prettified to normalize it.
• The character count of the prettified source code will be collected.
• An obfuscator will be executed on the prettified source code.
• The character count of the obfuscated code will be collected.
• The obfuscated code will be prettified using the same settings as the original
source code.
• A diff tool will be used to generate a count of added and removed characters,
between the prettified original source code and the prettified obfuscated source
code.
A “diff” percentage will then be calculated by comparing the number of added and
removed characters in the diff, to the number of total characters in the diff.
This methodology is codified inside the evaluate.sh script to ensure the results can
be replicated easily for each source code file.
The difference metrics should give a good indication of how resilient the obfuscator is.
It will also give an indication of the obscurity. The higher the difference between the
original code and the prettified code the stronger the obscurity and resilience.
7.1 Tools and resources
The obfuscators used in the evaluation are:
• The obfuscator application developed in this dissertation, with identifier renam-
ing enabled
• Stunnix C/C++ Obfuscator (Evaluation version), with default settings
• Tigress C Obfuscator, with the EncodeLiterals and EncodeArithmetic transfor-
mations enabled on all functions
Character counts are collected using the wc tool. Diffing of files is performed using
git diff.
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The 5 source code files include revcomp.gcc, fannkuchredux.gcc, regexredux.gcc-4.gcc,
pidigits.gcc, and mandelbrot.gcc from the Debian Benchmarks Game11, these files
can be downloaded from their website12.
7.2 Results
Table 2: Evaluation results.
File Original size
Obfuscator
Diff
Stunnix
Diff Tigress Diff
revcomp.gcc 6549 66.2% 54.8% 72.3%
fannkuchredux.gcc 1605 71.5% 57.9% 68.8%
regexredux.gcc-4.gcc 7106 58.8% 54.9% Error
pidigits.gcc 1219 66.4% 55.3% 80.0%
mandelbrot.gcc 2465 67.8% 56.7% Error
All obfuscators perform admirably, achieving a difference metric of at least 55%.
The Tigress obfuscator was not able to obfuscate all the source code files, the
failures were due to limitations in its parser which is based on CIL. Despite this
it achieved some of the best metrics, reaching as high as 80% when obfuscating
pidigits. The Tigress obfuscator is very customizable, and offers far more advanced
obfuscation transformations than the ones used in this evaluation, including JIT13
and Virtualization14 transformations. These transformations have not been enabled
as they simply wouldn’t be comparable.
The results are fairly consistent for the Stunnix obfuscator, with an average of 55.9%,
this is very low in comparison to the other obfuscators. It’s important to note that
the Stunnix obfuscator used for this evaluation was a trial version which has some
limits, in particular instead of renaming identifiers completely it only prefixes them
with ReplacementFor_. It’s likely this is the explanation for its low performance.
11https://benchmarksgame-team.pages.debian.net/benchmarksgame/
12http://benchmarksgame.alioth.debian.org/download/benchmarksgame-sourcecode.zip
13http://tigress.cs.arizona.edu/transformPage/docs/jitter/index.html
14http://tigress.cs.arizona.edu/transformPage/docs/virtualize/index.html
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C/C++ code. Several simple and advanced transformations have been implemented
successfully as set out in the system requirements, and at least one large software
project was successfully obfuscated using the developed tool. Furthermore, a novel
approach to the evaluation of obfuscators was devised and used to compare the system
developed to a state of the art commercial C/C++ obfuscator and to the Tigress
obfuscator, yielding great results in favour of the developed system.
During development and testing several opportunities for future work have been iden-
tified. First of all, it was found that the preprocessor absorbs some vital information
such as conditional compilation constructs. These are required for the appropriate
obfuscation of platform-independent code. Multiple approaches to resolving this have
been proposed in the relevant sections.
In addition to the above, the obfuscator currently only implements one advanced form
of obfuscation. There is a lot of room for different transformations to be implemented,
including ones described in detail in various research papers. Indeed, most of the time
spent on this system was to research and develop the foundations for an obfuscator,
the system is a good base for further obfuscation research.
Taking inspiration from a paper by Regano et al. [12], in order to properly evaluate
the obfuscation quality, it would be good to create an experiment where humans
attempt to reverse engineer source code under lab conditions.
Some of the design choices used in this dissertation were particularly good, including
the decision to store the original code of each AST and use it to bootstrap the
renderer. This allowed the obfuscator to be rapidly developed. Others were not so
good, the decision to use libclang means that some information about the AST is not
easily accessible, it provided a quick way to get started but a rewrite of this project
would likely benefit from using the clang parser directly.
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